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Abstract
We introduce a new distinction between inequality in initial endowments (e.g.
ability, inherited wealth) and inequality of what one can obtain as rewards (e.g.
prestigious positions, money). We show that, when society allocates resources via
tournaments, these two types of inequality have opposing eﬀects on equilibrium
behavior and wellbeing. Greater inequality of rewards hurts most people — both
the middle class and the poor — who are forced into greater eﬀort. Conversely,
greater inequality of endowments benefits the middle class. Thus, the correctness
of our intuitions about the implications of inequality is hugely aﬀected by the
type of inequality considered.
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Perhaps there is no other economic debate older than that over inequality. While
most people agree that some reduction of inequality is desirable, there is no consensus
over what is meant by equality, nor over what should be equalized (see Amartya Sen
(1980), Ronald Dworkin (1981a,b), Henry Phelps Brown (1988), John E. Roemer (1996),
and many others). For many economists, the second fundamental welfare theorem
separates distributional issues from the analysis of eﬃciency. As a result, the bulk of
the current literature on inequality concentrates either on the measurement of inequality,
or on the fairness of particular resource distributions.
Here, we address the issue of inequality from a purely economic perspective. We
assume a society where individuals diﬀer in terms of initial endowments, whether it is
innate ability, education received or inherited wealth, and where these endowments are
private information. Further, the rewards that individuals receive as a result of their
performance are assigned by a tournament. A fixed set of rewards, that could represent
cash prizes, places at a prestigious university, attractive jobs, desirable spouses, social
esteem, monopoly rents or any combination of these, vary in terms of their desirability.
Individuals make a simultaneous decision about how to divide their endowments be-
tween performance in the tournament and private consumption or leisure. Then each
individual is given a reward according to his rank in the distribution of performance:
first prize is given to first place, second prize to second place, and so on.
Such a tournament creates important positional externalities, as to obtain a top
reward one must occupy a top position, and by doing so one excludes others from that
position and hence that reward. As observed by Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath
and Andrew Postlewaite (1992) (see also Postlewaite (1998)), this induces competitors
to behave as though they had a desire for high relative position, such as in Robert
H. Frank’s (1985) classic model of status. In turn, this leads to equilibrium eﬀort
being ineﬃciently high and equilibrium utility being ineﬃciently low. Crucially, these
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externalities also imply that the equilibrium choice of eﬀort and equilibrium utility
depend on both the initial distribution of endowments and the distribution of rewards.
Therefore, there is no need to appeal to any notion of justice for inequality to matter.
It matters because what others have aﬀects the job one gets, the wage one is paid and
the amount of leisure one takes.
In particular, the shape and the range of the distributions of endowments and re-
wards themselves determine the marginal return to eﬀort. Thus, changes in the level
of inequality of either distribution can aﬀect the equilibrium behavior and utility even
of those individuals who see neither a change in their own endowment nor in reward.
Further, we find that changes in the inequality of endowments have the opposite eﬀect
to changes in the inequality of rewards. A decrease in the inequality of competitors’
endowments raises the return to eﬀort as it is easier to overtake one’s rivals. This leads
to higher eﬀort for low and middle ranking agents. Furthermore, equilibrium utility
falls at middle and high ranks and even those with higher endowments can be worse oﬀ
in the less unequal and hence more competitive distribution. However, a decrease in
the inequality of rewards implies there is less diﬀerence between a high prize and a low
one. This leads to a reduction in incentives and a decrease in equilibrium eﬀort for low
and middle ranking competitors, and an increase in their equilibrium utility. Indeed,
under some conditions, even stronger welfare eﬀects are possible - namely that reduced
inequality of rewards can make all better oﬀ.
Simply put, in the tournament model we consider, a reduction in inequality of
rewards can benefit most of society, but lower inequality of endowments can harm the
majority. Thus, the inequality of rewards has a much better fit with our intuition about
the eﬀects of inequality than the inequality of endowments.
In such a model, even policy interventions such as lump-sum taxes and transfers will
have an impact on incentives as they change either the distribution of endowments or of
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rewards. In fact, there are two distinct eﬀects from any changes in the level of inequality.
The first, which we call the direct eﬀect, is simply that under a less unequal distribution
of endowments or rewards lower ranked individuals will have greater endowments or
rewards respectively. However, in either case, there is also the second eﬀect, which we
call the incentive or social competitiveness eﬀect. Crucially, the incentive eﬀect of a
decrease in inequality of endowments is positive and opposite of that of a decrease in the
inequality of rewards, which decreases incentives. This incentive eﬀect is created by the
competitive externalities present in our tournament model. So, in their absence such
as in more conventional neoclassical models, there are only the direct eﬀects so that
reward and endowment inequality would appear to have similar results. This is possibly
why the distinction between rewards and endowments has not been made before.
We further contribute to the modelling of inequality by demonstrating the impor-
tance of the method of tracking individuals when endowments change. There are two
ways of doing this: compare choices and outcomes at a given level of endowment or at
a given rank in the distribution of endowments. As Ed Hopkins and Tatiana Kornienko
(2009) point out and as we show here, the two methods of indexing lead to seemingly
contradictory results: lower inequality of endowments leads to higher utility at a given
low rank, but lower utility at a given low endowment. However, since in a less unequal
distribution low-ranked individuals tend to have higher endowments, these are simply
two diﬀerent ways of looking at the same results.
In summary, our contribution is five-fold. First, we show that, in the tournament
model we consider here, inequality can have a direct impact on material outcomes, and
thus can be examined using positive methods of economic analysis. Second, we identify
two diﬀerent types of inequality, and examine them within the same model. Third,
by employing novel techniques, we show that the two types of inequality often have
opposite eﬀects on material outcomes. Fourth, we contrast the results obtained using
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two diﬀerent indexing methods. Finally, we argue that tournament models help us to
understand diﬀerent types of social inequality and, thus, help to answer the normative
question - which inequality should we care about.
0.1 Related Literature
Why should we assume that rewards are determined by tournaments rather than by
competitive markets? An important reason is empirical. Tournament-like mechanisms
are used in practice to determine university admissions, entry into certain professions
and promotions and pay within firms. Second, relative position seems to matter for
welfare. There is now a significant body of research that suggests that indicators of
wellbeing — such as job satisfaction (Gordon D.A. Brown, Jonathan Gardner, Andrew
Oswald, and Jing Qian (2008)), health (Michael G. Marmot et al. (1991), Micheal
G. Marmot (2004)) and overall happiness (Richard Easterlin (1974)) — are strongly
determined by relative position. That is, a highly ranked individual in a poor country
can have greater health and happiness than a low ranked individual in a richer country,
even though the latter has greater material prosperity. There are two leading hypotheses
to explain these empirical findings. The first, pioneered in modern economics by James
S. Duesenberry (1949) and Frank (1985), is that people have an intrinsic concern for
relative position or status. The second hypothesis is due to the fundamental insight of
Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992) that many of life’s crucial rewards are allocated by
tournament-like mechanisms, and this induces the appearance of preference for status.
By analyzing a tournament model, clearly we favor the second rationale for why
welfare depends on relative position. Yet, equally, our present analysis of the eﬀects of
inequality would be also applicable to a model of intrinsic relative concerns. Broadly
consistent with our current results, Gary S. Becker, Kevin M. Murphy and Ivan Wern-
ing (2005) find that, in a model of status, agents would willingly take lotteries that
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would increase what we would call here the inequality of endowments. Inequality of
endowments in status models is also explored in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004, 2009).
The crucial diﬀerence is that here we also consider the inequality of rewards, as well
as employing a more general specification when considering endowments. Thus, our
results concerning the eﬀects of changes in the level of inequality of endowments are
generalizations of those in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004, 2009). However, the results
on the inequality of rewards, and the idea of contrasting them with the results on in-
equality of endowments, which we see as the main contribution of the current paper,
are entirely novel.
The literature on tournaments and contests is extensive. As Kai Konrad (2009)
points out in a survey, increased heterogeneity amongst competitors and decreased
spread of prizes are both known to reduce equilibrium eﬀort.1 The technical contribution
here is to consider very general comparative statics for large populations of competitors.
The use of rank-order tournament models to study non-market allocation of resources
was pioneered by Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992, 1995, 1998), followed by Unal
Zenginobuz (1996) and Raquel Fernández and Jordi Galí (1999). However, their focus
of interest is not inequality but a comparison of diﬀerent institutions for assigning
rewards. Two further papers are technically particularly close to our work, yet they
also look at diﬀerent issues. Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela (2006) consider what
would be the optimal contest design from the perspective of a contest designer who
aimed to maximize either the expected total eﬀort or the expected highest eﬀort from
contestants. Heidrun Hoppe, Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela (2009) generalize this
approach to a two-sided matching tournament problem.
One important assumption of our tournament model is that there is a fixed dis-
1Much of this literature concentrates on games in which the mechanism that awards prizes is
assumed to be at least partly stochastic. What we model here in a contrast could be called a perfectly
discriminating rank order tournament or contest.
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tribution of indivisible rewards. The justification for this is that in reality there are
many desirable things, jobs, places at university, marriage opportunities, that do diﬀer
in quality and which are not divisible. A subtle criticism is that even if rewards are
indivisible, they might be assigned by prices rather than performance, which might im-
prove eﬃciency. This possibility is analyzed in a diﬀerent literature where workers are
matched to (indivisible) jobs by an endogenous wage schedule. For example, Robert M.
Costrell and Glenn C. Loury (2004) and Wing Suen (2007) have considered changes in
the distribution of ability of workers and in the quality of jobs. There is no incentive
eﬀect as there is no choice of eﬀort by workers and all outcomes are Pareto eﬃcient, in
distinct contrast to the situation we model. Nonetheless, the shape of the distributions
of ability and of jobs aﬀects the distribution of wages. That is, changes in the level of
inequality can have a material eﬀect on outcomes even if there is a price mechanism.2
We also argue that our distinction between endowments and rewards to be novel
in that it diﬀers from the most common existing concepts of equality on three levels.
First, we argue that equality of rewards and endowments are logically separate from
equality of opportunity. Here, as rewards are determined solely by performance, agents
always face equality of opportunity, yet the levels of reward and endowment equality
vary.3 Existing merit-, desert- or eﬀort-based theories of justice assume that those who
work more, or have greater merit, should have greater rewards (see James Konow (2003)
for a survey), however, there seems to be little discussion of the fact that the reward
schedule could vary even in the presence of equality of opportunity. Talent could vary
widely, but the most talented could receive a monetary reward only slightly greater
than the least talented. Alternatively, small diﬀerences in talent could lead to big
2More technically, inequality of endowments and inequality of rewards will have opposing eﬀects
regardless of whether matching between competitors and jobs or rewards is done under transferable
utility or non-transferable utility. See Ed Hopkins (2005) for a comparison of the two cases.
3The equality of opportunity we consider here is non-discriminatory, or “formal” in the sense of
Roemer (1996, p. 163), and “competitive” in the sense of D.A. Lloyd Thomas (1977) and S. J. D.
Green (1989). We discuss the relation of our work to previous literature on equality in greater detail
in the working paper version of this paper.
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diﬀerences in outcomes. Second, in the distributive justice literature (see John Rawls
(1971), Dworkin (1981b), Roemer (1996, 1998) among others), one often encounters
the question of equality of “resources” (wealth, but also possibly education or talent).
However, these works make no distinction about timing or causation, in the sense that
there is no distinction made between what one has initially (endowment) and what
one is able to obtain (reward). Third, equality of rewards should not be confused with
equality of welfare or equality of outcomes. In this model at least, the welfare of an
individual depends jointly on a set of outcomes that includes her endowment, her choice
of eﬀort as well as her reward.
1 The Model
In this section, we develop our model, where a large population competes in a tournament-
like market to obtain rewards or prizes. We have in mind three prime examples. The
first is students competing for places at college. The second is a market for jobs. For
example, students in the final year of graduate school seek faculty positions at universi-
ties. The third is a marriage market, where singles attempt to attract desirable potential
spouses. These three situations are modelled as tournaments by Fernández and Galí
(1999), Hopkins (2005) and Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992) respectively. We will
use the terminology of “contestants” competing for rewards. Contestants have to make
a decision on how to allocate their initial endowment between private consumption and
visible performance that acts as a signal of underlying ability. Each contestant is then
awarded a reward or prize. These are awarded assortatively with the best performer be-
ing awarded the top prize, the median performer the median prize and so on downward
with the worst performer receiving the last prize.
We assume a continuum of contestants. They are diﬀerentiated in quality with con-
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testants having diﬀering endowments z with endowments being allocated according to
the publicly known distribution G(z) on [z, z¯] with z ≥ 0. The level of each contestant’s
endowment is her private information. The distribution G(z) is twice diﬀerentiable with
strictly positive density g(z). A contestant’s level of endowment z has possible interpre-
tations such as her wealth or an ability parameter that determines maximum potential
performance.4 In particular, contestants must divide their endowments between visible
performance x and private consumption or leisure y.
There is also a continuum of prizes or rewards of value s whose publicly known
distribution has the twice diﬀerentiable distribution function H(s) on [s, s¯] and strictly
positive density h(s). While the rewards could simply be in cash, this is not necessarily
the case. In the context of the academic job market, s could be interpreted as prestige or
reputation of a university, in the marriage market, s could be a measure of attractiveness
to the opposite sex. After the contestants’ choice of performance, rewards will be
awarded assortatively, so that the contestant with the highest performance x will gain
the prize with highest value s¯. More generally, the rank of the prize awarded will be
equal to a contestant’s rank in terms of performance.
We have two ideas in mind why rewards might be assigned in such a way. First, such
mechanisms are often used in situations such as college admissions to promote a form of
equality of opportunity. For example, if z represents ability and x represents academic
performance, then the highest rewards go to contestants with the highest performance
which in the equilibrium we consider will be those of highest ability.5 Second, the other
side of the market could consist of people, potential spouses or employers, rather than
inanimate prizes. These potential partners would have to choose between contestants.
4For example, suppose all contestants are endowed with the same amount of time that can be used
for production or leisure. Then, let z be productivity per hour and a contestant devoting a proportion
x/z of time to production will have performance x.
5Fernández and Galí (1999) show that such mechanisms can be more eﬃcient than markets in
assigning educational opportunities when capital markets are imperfect.
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But it is easy enough to specify suitable preferences for the partners such that the
end result in equilibrium would be the same: the best performing contestant obtains
the best match.6 Here, we assume that such partners are interested in a contestant’s
performance x mostly in terms of what it signals about his underlying endowment of
ability z.
A contestant’s endowment z can be employed in performance x or private consump-
tion y = z − x (that is, the rate of conversion between x and y is normalized to one).
All contestants have the same utility function
U(x, y, s) = U(x, z − x, s). (1)
We assume that utility is increasing in all three arguments, performance x, private
consumption y and the reward s. That is, there is some private benefit to performance,
for example, private satisfaction from studying.7 While it is possible to divide one’s
endowment between x and y, the only way to obtain a reward s is to take part in the
tournament.
We assume a series of standard conditions on the utility function that will enable
us to derive a monotone equilibrium and clear comparative statics results. (i) U is
twice continuously diﬀerentiable (smoothness); (ii) Ux(x, y, s) > 0, Uy(x, y, s) > 0,
Us(x, y, s) > 0 (monotonicity); (iii) Uxy(x, y, s) > 0, Uys(x, y, s) ≥ 0 and Uxs(x, y, s) ≥ 0
(complementarity); (iv) Uii(x, y, s) ≤ 0 for i = x, y, s (own concavity); (v) Ux(x, z −
x, s)−Uy(x, z− x, s) = 0 has a unique solution x = γ(z, s) and whenever x ≥ γ(z, s) it
holds that Uxs(x, z − x, s) − Uys(x, z − x, s) ≤ 0. This last condition seems somewhat
complicated but it is automatically satisfied if utility is additively or multiplicatively
6See Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992, 1998) for explicit consideration of voluntary matching
between contestants and potential partners.
7Nothing substantial depends on this assumption. All results are qualitatively the same if x has no
intrinsic value for contestants.
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separable in s. Note also that it implies a competitor would choose a positive perfor-
mance x even when there are no competitive pressures.
It is natural, perhaps, to think of a competitor’s type as her level of endowment.
However, given an endowment distribution G(z), an agent with endowment z˜ has rank
r˜ = G(z˜) and it is just as valid to think of her type as being r˜ as much as it is z˜ (recall
that we assumed that G(·) is strictly increasing on its support so that there is a one-to-
one relation between endowment and rank). There are several advantages of indexing by
rank over indexing by endowment level as discussed in detail in Hopkins and Kornienko
(2009) and in Section 2 here. Nonetheless, we will use both methods, with indexing
by level of endowment to be found in Section 4. In this section, we will treat each
competitor’s type as her rank r. Notice that an agent’s endowment can be expressed
as a function of her rank or z˜ = G−1(r˜) (i.e. z˜ is at the r˜-quantile). In particular, let
us write Z(r) = G−1(r). Thus, her strategy will be a mapping x(r) : [0, 1]→ R+ from
rank to performance.
Then, a symmetric equilibrium will be a Nash equilibrium in which all contestants
use the same strategy, that is, the same mapping x(r) from rank in endowments to
performance. Suppose for the moment that all contestants adopt such a strategy x(r)
that, furthermore, is diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing (we will go on to show that
such an equilibrium exists). Let us aggregate all the performance decisions of the
contestants into a distribution function F (x). If x(r) is strictly increasing, then there
will be no mass points in the distribution of performance, so that F (x) is continuous and
strictly increasing. Note that when all contestants follow such a strategy, the outcome
would be fully separating. One can deduce a contestant’s endowments z or his rank in
the distribution of endowments r from his choice of performance x.
We assume that formal equality of opportunity holds, so that rewards are assigned
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to contestants solely on the basis of an agent’s visible performance, x.8 In contrast,
inequality of opportunity would be exhibited by a rule whereby the allocation of rewards
depended on some further, extraneous factor such as race, age, gender or social status.9
Given that rewards are indivisible and are ranked from lowest to highest, the obvious
way to assign rewards in a way that would satisfy equality of opportunity is assortatively:
rewards are assigned on the basis of one’s rank F (x) in performance with the highest
performance obtaining the highest reward and so on. This assignment should also
be measure-preserving (the equivalent, given a continuum of prizes and contestants,
of awarding exactly one prize to each contestant). A possible way to do this is to
assign rewards assortatively so that rank in rewards equals rank in endowments, or
H(s) = G(z). Note that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium where the strategy x(r) is
strictly increasing in an agent’s rank, we have thatG(z) = F (x) = r. That is, an agent’s
rank r in the distribution of endowments G(z) is equal to her rank in the distribution
of performance. In turn, if rewards are assigned assortatively according to performance
so that an agent’s rank in the distribution of performance F (x) is equal to her rank in
the distribution of rewards H(s), so that G(z) = F (x) = H(s) = r. Then we have an
assignment that satisfies equality of opportunity and is measure preserving.
Remark 1 Equality of opportunity implies that rewards are assigned assortatively based
on a competitor’s performance x so that the rank of the reward H(s) is equal his/her
rank in the distribution of performance F (x). In a fully separating equilibrium, this is
8Roemer (1996, p. 163) defines formal equality of opportunity as “there is no legal bar to access to
education, to all positions and jobs, and that all hiring is meritocratic”.
9Andrew Schotter and Keith Weigelt (1992) consider the eﬀect of inequality of opportunity in
stochastic contests with two contestants and find that both theoretically and experimentally that it
reduces eﬀort. Similar analysis within our model would call for more advanced methods as inequality
of opportunities here would imply an additional dimension of inequality among agents, and thus we
leave such analysis for future research.
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equal to his/her rank in endowments so that
G(z) = F (x) = H(s) = r. (2)
That implies that, in such an equilibrium, an agent of rank r is allocated a reward
s = H−1(r).
Note that this relationship (2) implies that we can define the function
S(r) = H−1(r), (3)
which gives the equilibrium reward of a contestant of type r, so that S : [0, 1]→ [s, s¯].
The marginal increase in reward from an increase in one’s rank would be
S0(r) =
1
h(H−1(r)))
=
1
h(S(r))
.
This also implies a reduced form utility:
U(x, y, s) = U(x(r), Z(r)− x(r), S(r))
That is, the tournament with assortative award of prizes implies that each individual’s
payoﬀs are increasing in her rank r in the distribution of contestants. It therefore might
appear to an outside observer that the individual had some form of social preferences
where she cares about her relative position, similar to those analyzed by Frank (1985)
and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004). As Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992) as well as
Postlewaite (1998) point out, this form of tournament therefore gives a strategic basis
to such models.
Continuing with the assumption that all agents adopt the same increasing, diﬀeren-
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tiable strategy x(r), let us see whether any individual agent has an incentive to deviate.
Suppose that instead of following the strategy followed by the others, an agent with
rank r chooses xi = x(r˜), that is, she chooses performance as though she had rank r˜.
Note that her utility would be equal to
U = U(x(r˜), Z(r)− x(r˜)), S(r˜)).
We diﬀerentiate this with respect to r˜. Then, given that in a symmetric equilibrium,
the agent uses the equilibrium strategy and so r˜ = r, this gives the first order condition,
x0(r) (Ux(x, Z(r)− x, S(r))− Uy(x,Z(r)− x, S(r))) + Us(x, Z(r)− x, S(r))S0(r) = 0.
(4)
This first order condition balances disutility from increasing eﬀort x against the implied
marginal benefit in terms of an increased reward from doing so. It defines a diﬀerential
equation,
x0(r) =
Us(x,Z(r)− x, S(r))
Uy(x,Z(r)− x, S(r))− Ux(x,Z(r)− x, S(r))
S0(r) = φ(x, Z(r), S(r))S0(r).
(5)
An important point to recognize is that this diﬀerential equation and the equilibrium
strategy, which is its solution, both depend on the distribution of endowments through
Z(r) = G−1(r) and the distribution of rewards through S(r) = H−1(r).
Our next step is to specify what Frank (1985) and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004)
call the “cooperative choice”, which is the optimal consumption choice (xc(r), yc(r))
when an individual cannot aﬀect her reward. Specifically, assume that an agent of rank
r is simply assigned a reward S(r) rather than having to compete for it. Her optimal
choice in these circumstances must satisfy the standard marginal condition
Ux(x,Z(r)− x, S(r))− Uy(x, Z(r)− x, S(r)) = 0. (6)
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By assumption (v) above, there is a solution xc(r) = γ(Z(r), S(r)) to this maximization
problem. The cooperative strategy also enables us to fix the appropriate boundary
condition for the diﬀerential equation (5). Thus, the initial condition, or the choice of
the individual with the lowest rank zero is,
x(0) = xc(0) . (7)
We can now show the following existence result. It shows that there is only one
fully separating equilibrium. Specifically, if all contestants adopt the strategy x(r) that
is the solution to the above diﬀerential equation (5) with boundary condition (7) and
rewards are awarded assortatively according to the rule (2), then no contestant has an
incentive to deviate. Further, as this solution x(r) is necessarily strictly increasing, it
is fully separating with contestants with high endowments producing a high level of
performance. Thus, an authority organizing the tournament to promote equality of
opportunity would be rational to give high rewards to high performers as high perfor-
mance signifies high ability. Or, in the matching story, potential partners should prefer
to match with high performers. Note, however, this will typically not be the only equi-
librium. As is common in signalling models, other equilibria such as pooling equilibria
will exist. In this paper, we concentrate on the separating equilibrium as this seems the
most natural for the settings we consider. We now present our result.
Proposition 1 The diﬀerential equation (5) with boundary conditions (7) has a unique
solution which is the only symmetric separating equilibrium of the tournament. Equi-
librium performance x(r) is greater than cooperative amount, that is x(r) > xc(r) on
(0, 1].
This implies that the cooperative outcome xc(r) Pareto dominates the equilibrium
performance x(r) from the point of view of the contestants. As is common in competitive
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situations, the contestants could make themselves all better oﬀ by agreeing to work less.
How much more will depend on the exact form of the equilibrium strategy x(r) which
in turn depends on the distribution of endowments and the distribution of rewards. We
will go on to look at how equilibrium choices and welfare change in response to changes
in these distributions.
Note that this welfare result holds even though contestants derive utility from their
own performance, that is, it is not a pure signal. However, if other parties, for exam-
ple, partners or employers, also benefit from the competitors’ eﬀorts, overall welfare
judgements are potentially more complicated. Hopkins (2005) looks at this issue and
finds that, in the presence of incomplete information, the level of performance can be
excessive even considering the welfare of employers. However, it is clearly true that if
contestants’ performance is suﬃciently valuable to society, then the equilibrium per-
formance level could be excessively low relative to the social optimum even if it too
high from their own perspective. Another possibility is that, like in Cole, Mailath and
Postlewaite’s (1992) original tournament model, the beneficiaries are the next gener-
ation. In this case, social competition leads to a growth rate that is higher than the
present generation would choose (see also Giacomo Corneo and Olivier Jeanne (1997)).
2 Two Eﬀects of Changes in Inequality
In this section we introduce the intuition behind our analysis of how changes in either the
distribution of endowments or in the distribution of rewards aﬀect individuals in rank-
based tournaments. We make the point that in both cases a change influences individual
welfare through two channels, a direct eﬀect and an incentive eﬀect. It is the second
eﬀect which is central to our tournament model in that here, in contrast to standard
models, changes in the endowment or rewards of others will change the incentives of
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individuals to engage in eﬀort. But even the direct eﬀect is not straightforward as it can
be positive or negative depending on whether it is viewed from a position of a constant
endowment or from a constant rank. These diﬀering eﬀects we now try to make clear
in a simple way before moving to formal results in the next section.
Consider first a situation where individuals diﬀer in their natural endowments, such
as talent, ability, physical attractiveness, and so on. Then, while the distribution of
endowments may change, through immigration for example, the endowment of an indi-
vidual will stay the same. However, if the distribution does change, then typically the
rank of such an individual will change even if her endowment does not. In such case,
it makes sense to fix an individual by the level of her endowment z, and consider what
happens as her rank r changes in response to changes in the distribution.
Consider instead a situation where individual endowments are in terms of income,
wealth, capital goods, and so on. In this case, an individual’s endowment is not intrin-
sic and could be changed. For example, a redistributive tax policy could change the
endowments of most (if not all) individuals. In such situations, it makes sense to fix an
individual by her rank in the distribution of endowments r, but allow for her endowment
z to change as the distribution of endowments varies.10 In essence, this is exactly what
policy analysts typically do by analyzing the consequences of redistributive policies for
people occupying diﬀerent ranks - for example, for the median individual or for lower
and upper quartiles.
The distinction among rank-indexing and level-indexing is very important for the
understanding of the eﬀects of changes in inequality. Not only do the two indexing
methods require diﬀerent comparative statics methods, they also diﬀer in how change
in inequality is channeled into individual choices and well-being, as we will now see.11
10When interventions are rank-preserving (such as with a proportional tax), analysis at a fixed rank
is equivalent doing analysis for a given individual before and after the change.
11The same issues arise in assignment models. For example, Costrell and Loury (2004) use what we
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In what follows we assume that there is a change in either the distributions of
endowments or in the distributions of rewards, but not both. That is, we do not change
both distributions at once. We label the initial distribution a for ex ante and the
changed distribution p for ex post. We will consider two regimes. In regime G, we
assume that there is no change in the distribution of rewards Ha = Hp = H but there
is a change in the distribution of endowments Ga 6= Gp. In regime H, we assume that
there is no change in the distribution of endowments, that is Ga = Gp = G, but the
distribution of rewards changes, i.e. Ha 6= Hp.
We go on to show how, given equality of opportunity, changes in the inequality
of endowments and rewards aﬀect diﬀerent individuals. We distinguish between two
diﬀerent consequences of changes in the level of inequality, which we call the direct
eﬀect and the incentive eﬀect.
2.1 The Direct Eﬀect
The direct eﬀect is what one would obtain under classical assumptions and it simply
arises because changes in the social or economic environment of an individual have
direct consequences on that individual’s choices and well-being - as they will change her
endowment z, or her rank r, and/or her reward s. These direct consequences will vary
with the indexing method.
To understand the direct eﬀect, suppose rewards were assigned non-competitively
by a social planner according to one’s rank in the endowment distribution, i.e. H(s) =
G(z), leading to the “cooperative” choices as set out in Section 1. Notice first that
diﬀerent endowment distributions imply that almost all individuals with fixed rank r
have diﬀerent endowments in the two societies, i.e. Za = G−1a (r) 6= G−1p (r) = Zp -
call rank indexing and Suen (2007) uses level indexing and obtain apparently diﬀerent results.
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even though their equilibrium reward S = H−1(r) does not change (see Figure 1). In
contrast, almost all individuals with fixed endowment z have diﬀerent ranks in the
two societies, i.e. ra = Ga(z) 6= Gp(z) = rp, and thus diﬀerent equilibrium rewards
Sa = H−1(Ga(z)) 6= H−1(Gp(z)) = Sp (see Figure 2).
An easy way to understand the diﬀerences between the two methods of indexing is to
compare Figures 1 and 2, which show similar changes in the distribution of endowments.
In both cases, the ex post distribution Gp is less unequal than the original distribution
Ga. As illustrated in Figure 2, for a fixed level of endowment z1, in the less unequal
distribution of endowments a low ranked agent will have a lower reward. That is,
the direct eﬀect of redistribution is negative for low-ranked agents under indexing by
endowment levels. However, in Figure 1, it is shown that for a fixed rank r1 a low
ranked agent will have the same reward but a higher level of endowments in a less
unequal distribution of rewards, the direct eﬀect of redistribution for the low ranked
is positive. Comparisons at a fixed level of endowment or at a fixed rank give a very
diﬀerent view of the same phenomenon.
In contrast, when we change the distribution of rewards, the direct eﬀect does not
depend on whether we index by rank or by level. The eﬀect of redistribution of rewards
will be positive for the low ranked. For example, see Figure 3 where now the ex post
distribution of rewards Hp is less unequal than the ex ante distribution Ha(s). We have
Sa = H−1a (r1) = H
−1
a (G(z1)) < H
−1
p (r1) = H
−1
p (G(z1)) = Sp. One can also see that it
will be negative for the high-ranked.
Remark 2 The direct eﬀect of lower inequality can be summarized as follows.
(i) Consider first rank-indexing. Suppose endowments become less unequal, then,
in equilibrium, low (high) ranking agents have higher (lower) endowments. Suppose,
instead, rewards become less unequal, then, in equilibrium, low (high) ranking agents
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endowments: z
rank
rewards: s
Za(r1) Zp(r1)ss¯
H(s) 1
S(r1)
r1
rˆ
Ga
Gp
Figure 1: The direct eﬀect in Regime G - under rank-indexing: a contestant with
low rank r1 has a higher endowment Zp(r1) under the less unequal distribution of
endowments Gp than the endowment Za(r1) under the more unequal distribution of
endowments Ga, and in both cases has a reward S(r1).
have higher (lower) rewards.
(ii) Consider now level-indexing. Suppose endowments become less unequal, then, in
equilibrium, low (high) ranking agents have lower (higher) rewards. Suppose, instead,
rewards become less unequal, then, in equilibrium, low (high) ranking agents, have higher
(lower) rewards.
Importantly, under rank indexing, the inequality of rewards and endowments appear
to have qualitatively similar patterns of benefits and losses when one looks only at
the direct (or classical, non-competitive) eﬀect, which may explain why reward and
endowment inequality have not been distinguished before. Though, note that under
level indexing, the direct eﬀect of lower inequality of endowments is opposite to that of
lower inequality of rewards.
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endowments: z
rank
rewards: s
z zˆ z¯z1
H(s) 1
Sa(z1) Sp(z1)
Gp Ga
Figure 2: The direct eﬀect in Regime G - under level-indexing: a contestant with fixed
low endowment z1 has a reward Sp(z1) under the less unequal distribution of endow-
ments Gp that is worse than the reward Sa(z1) under the more unequal distribution of
endowments Ga.
2.2 The Incentive Eﬀect
Now let us turn to the incentive (or marginal, positional, strategic, or social competi-
tiveness) eﬀect of changes in inequality. Importantly, the eﬀect of lower dispersion in
rewards and endowments have an opposite incentive eﬀect regardless of the indexing
method used. The incentive eﬀect is the result of agents’ strategic interactions. As
was shown in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004, 2009), in the non-cooperative game where
agent’s rank matters for her welfare, the “social density”, or “social competitiveness”,
is important as it changes incentives. The incentive eﬀect of changes in distributions on
individual choices and welfare will depends largely on the densities of endowments and
rewards, g(z) and h(s). This incentive eﬀect can be modelled using the dispersion order
(presented in Appendix A) which is a stochastic order used to compare distributions in
terms of their densities.
20
endowments: z
rank
rewards: s
Hp
Ha
z z¯z1
r1
ss¯
1
Sa(r1)Sp(r1)
G(z)
Figure 3: The direct eﬀect in Regime H - under rank- and level-indexing: a contestant
with low rank r1 has higher reward Sp(r1) under the less unequal distribution of rewards
Hp than reward Sa(r1) under the more unequal distribution of rewards Sa.
Remark 3 The incentive eﬀect of lower inequality can be summarized as follows.
(i) Suppose endowments become less dispersed, then there is an increase in the mar-
ginal return to eﬀort, as it is now easier to surpass neighbors, so that agents tend to
increase their eﬀort.
(ii) Suppose rewards become less dispersed, then there is a decrease in the marginal
return to eﬀort as rewards are now more similar, so that agents tend to decrease their
eﬀort.
To find the total eﬀect, which includes both direct and incentive eﬀects, one needs
to analyze how changes in inequality aﬀects behavior, which we turn to now.
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3 Eﬀects of Changing Inequality Under Indexing
By Rank
We will now consider the eﬀect on equilibrium utility and strategies of changes in the
distribution of endowments G(z) and changes in the distribution of rewards H(s). In
this section, we do this by comparing behavior before and after the change at each rank
in the distribution of endowments, using the rank indexing methodology as discussed
in Section 2. We saw in Section 1 that equilibrium behavior depends on the reward
function S which is jointly determined by G and H. Thus, as the distribution of
endowments G or the distribution of rewards H change, so does the reward function
S. Thus, a change in either distribution of endowments or rewards (or both) translates
into a change in equilibrium choice of performance x(r) and, thus, into a change in
individual welfare.
Equilibrium utility in terms of rank will be U(r) = U(x(r), Z(r) − x(r), S(r)). By
the envelope theorem we have
U 0(r) =
Uy(x(r), Z(r)− x(r), S(r))
g(Z(r))
(8)
Note that as average utility is
R
U(r)dr, if individual welfare U(r) rises at every rank
then social welfare will surely rise.
In what follows we assume that there is a change in either the distributions of
endowments or in the distributions of rewards, but not both. In doing this, we make use
of the dispersion order, which as the name suggests, is a way of ordering distributions in
terms of their dispersion. Please see Appendix A for details. Our results with respect
to inequality of endowments are a generalization of those in Hopkins and Kornienko
(2009).
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3.1 Change in Endowments (Regime G)
We investigate in this section the eﬀects of changes in the distribution of endowments
on equilibrium performance decisions and equilibrium utility. In particular, we find
that a decrease in the inequality of endowments can have adverse eﬀects. This is
because as peoples’ endowments become closer together, it is easier to overtake one’s
neighbors. This leads to a general increase in social competition. While redistribution
can benefit those who receive higher endowments, even some of these will be worse oﬀ
as a consequence of greater competition.
In regime G, we assume that the societies have identical distributions of rewards,
i.e. Ha = Hp = H, but diﬀer in the distributions of endowments, i.e. Ga 6= Gp and in
fact are distinct, that is, equal at only a finite number of points. Diﬀerent endowments
imply that the two societies have diﬀerent endowment functions, i.e. Za = G−1a (r) and
Zp = G−1p (r).
Our first result is to show that if a range of contestants receive an increase in
endowments, they will respond with higher performance.
Proposition 2 Suppose that endowments are higher ex post so that Zp(r) ≥ Za(r)
on an interval [0, rˆ] where rˆ is the point of first crossing of Zp(r) and Za(r). Then
xp(0) ≥ xa(0) and ex post performance is higher on that interval: xp(r) > xa(r) on
(0, rˆ].
As a consequence, if the new distribution of endowmentsGp stochastically dominates
the old, then performance will be higher for all agents. Note that if Gp stochastically
dominates Ga then by definition Gp(z) ≤ Ga(z) for all z, which in turn implies that
Zp(r) ≥ Za(r) for all r ∈ [0, 1]. That is, in a richer society where endowments are higher
for every agent, performance is higher for all.
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Corollary 1 Suppose that endowments are stochastically higher ex post so that Zp(r) ≥
Za(r) for all r ∈ [0, 1], then performance rises almost everywhere: xp(r) > xa(r) on
(0, 1].
We can now give a suﬃcient condition for equilibrium utility to rise for all agents and
hence for an increase in social welfare. The condition has two parts. First, endowments
must be more dispersed in the sense of the dispersion order, or Gp ≥d Ga (see Appendix
A for the definition and properties of this and subsequently used stochastic orders).
Second, the lowest ranked agent must be no worse oﬀ, or Zp(0) ≥ Za(0). The point
is that, as utility both depends on endowments and the degree of social competition,
one can guarantee an increase in endowments will lead to an increase in utility if at the
same time the social density does not rise.
Proposition 3 Suppose endowments are more dispersed ex post Gp ≥d Ga and mini-
mum endowments no lower Zp(0) ≥ Za(0), then utility is higher ex post almost every-
where: Up(r) > Ua(r) on (0, 1].
Our final result in this subsection concerns a decrease in inequality. As remarked,
there are two resulting eﬀects. Figure 1 illustrates the direct eﬀect: with a less unequal
distribution of endowments, the low ranked have higher endowments ex post. However,
as we have argued, the marginal eﬀect works toward greater competition. As people are
closer together, it is easier to overtake one’s neighbors. For the low ranked, the direct
eﬀect dominates. For the middle class, the marginal eﬀect is more important, whereas
for the upper classes, they lose both from redistribution and from greater competition.
We thus find that the middle and upper classes are worse oﬀ. This is illustrated in
Figure 4.
Specifically, we suppose the distribution of endowments becomes less dispersed in
terms of the dispersion order. Furthermore, the lowest ranked agent has more endow-
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Figure 4: Less unequal endowments, indexing by rank: typical comparative statics when
ex post endowments Zp are less unequal than ex ante Za. Performance rises at lower
and middle ranks; but utility falls at middle and upper ranks.
ments, or Zp(0) > Za(0), and the highest ranked has less Zp(1) < Za(1). Thus, in a
clear sense the distribution Gp of endowments is less unequal than distribution Ga.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the minimum level of endowments is higher ex post
Zp(0) > Za(0) (9)
and endowments are less dispersed ex post
gp(Zp(r)) ≥ ga(Za(r)) for all r ∈ (0, 1)⇔ Ga ≥d Gp (10)
and also suppose that the maximum level of endowments is lower ex post
Zp(1) < Za(1) (11)
Then, performance is higher ex post for the bottom and middle: xp(r) > xa(r) on [0, rˆ]
where rˆ is the only point of crossing of Za(r) and Zp(r). Second, utility rises at the
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bottom, Up(0) > Ua(0), but utility is lower ex post for the middle and top, Up(r) < Ua(r)
for all r ∈ [rˆ, 1].
Note that this result implies that there are middle ranking agents who are worse oﬀ
even though they have higher endowments ex post (again see Figure 4 for the outcomes
for individuals just to the left of rˆ). However, the eﬀect at the relatively low ranked
individuals, i.e. those with r ∈ (0, rˆ) is, in general, ambiguous.
3.2 Changes in Rewards (Regime H)
In this subsection, we find that the eﬀects of changes in rewards are quite diﬀerent
from those arising from changes in endowments. The first point is that the eﬀect
of a decrease in inequality in rewards has the opposite incentive eﬀect to a decrease
in inequality of endowments. Lower inequality of rewards implies that the marginal
return to greater eﬀort is relatively low, and will tend to reduce competition. This will
tend to make competitors better oﬀ. However, for high ranking competitors who expect
high rewards, the eﬀect is ambiguous. In a less unequal society they work less hard but
obtain lower rewards.
In regime H, we assume that the societies have identical distributions of endow-
ments, i.e. Ga = Gp = G, but diﬀer in the distributions of rewards, i.e. Ha 6= Hp
and in fact are distinct, that is, equal at only a finite number of points.. Again, dif-
ferent rewards imply that the two societies have also diﬀerent reward functions, i.e.
Sa(r) = H−1a (r) and Sp(r) = H
−1
p (r).
Our first result concerns suﬃcient conditions for greater eﬀort by all competitors.
We find that if rewards are lower at every rank and the rewards are more dispersed,
then the environment is definitely more competitive and eﬀort rises at every rank.
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Proposition 5 Suppose that the rewards are more dispersed ex post
S0p(r) ≥ S0a(r) on (0, 1)⇔ hp(Sp(r)) ≤ ha(Sa(r)) on (0, 1)⇔ Hp ≥d Ha (12)
and that the minimum reward is lower ex post
Sp(0) < Sa(0) (13)
and then performance is higher ex post so that xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, rˆ] where rˆ is the
first crossing point of Sp(r) and Sa(r).
This leads to the following corollary. If rewards are more unequal and lower at every
rank, then performance increases for every agent.
Corollary 2 Suppose that the ex-post rewards are more dispersed and also are stochas-
tically lower, i.e. Hp ≥d Ha and Sp(r) ≤ Sa(r) for all r ∈ [0, 1], then performance rises
almost everywhere: xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, 1].
Note that if one makes stronger assumptions on the utility function, one can still
obtain an increase in performance at all ranks without the stochastic dominance as-
sumption of Corollary 2. First, we look at the case of utility being additively separable
in rewards.
Proposition 6 Assume utility is additively separable in rewards, that is U = V (x, y)+s
for some function V such that conditions (i) to (v) on U are still satisfied, then if
Hp ≥d Ha, it follows that xp(r) > xa(r) almost everywhere on [0, 1].
We can obtain a similar result if utility is multiplicatively separable in rewards. For
such preference specification, we will use another method of comparing distributions,
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the star order. This order is defined and discussed in detail in Appendix A. Informally,
the star order implies that Hp is more dispersed or stochastically lower than Ha but
not necessarily both. Compare the next result to Corollary 2), where we assumed that
Hp is both more dispersed and stochastically lower than Ha.
Proposition 7 If rewards are multiplicatively separable or U = V (x, y)s for some func-
tion V such that conditions (i) to (v) on U are still satisfied, then if , Hp is more dis-
persed in the star order than Ha, or Hp ≥∗ Ha, it follows that xp(r) > xa(r) almost
everywhere on [0, 1].
We next identify a suﬃcient condition for an increase in equilibrium utility at every
rank. This is much simpler than when considering changes in the distribution of en-
dowments. Here, we simply require that the new distribution Hp stochastically domi-
nates the old Ha and that the lowest reward Sp(0) is strictly higher. This implies that
Sp(r) ≥ Sa(r) for all r, or rewards are higher at every rank. As this will also decrease
the incentives to compete, it is not surprising that equilibrium utility rises.
Proposition 8 If the minimum reward is higher ex post Sp(0) > Sa(0) and rewards
are everywhere else no lower, Sp(r) ≥ Sa(r) for all r ∈ (0, 1], then utility is everywhere
higher ex post: Up(r) > Ua(r) on [0, 1].
We now turn to inequality. As illustrated in Figure 3, the direct eﬀect of lower
inequality in rewards benefits the low-ranked simply because their rewards will typically
be higher. Furthermore, the compression of rewards will decrease the marginal incentive
to compete and performance will fall. Thus, this marginal eﬀect will further benefit
contestants. Thus, as we see in Figure 5, utility will rise even for the agent with rank
rˆ whose reward is unchanged.
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Figure 5: Less unequal rewards, indexing by rank: typical comparative statics when ex
post rewards Sp are less unequal than ex ante Sa. Performance falls and utility rises at
low and middle ranks.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the lowest reward is higher ex post
Sp(0) > Sa(0) (14)
and also rewards are less dispersed ex post
S0p(r) ≤ S0a(r) for all r ∈ (0, 1)⇔ Ha ≥d Hp (15)
and also suppose that the highest reward is lower ex post
Sp(1) < Sa(1). (16)
Then performance is lower ex post xp(r) < xa(r) on (0, rˆ] where rˆ is the only point of
crossing of Sa(r) and Sp(r). Second, utility is higher on that interval: Up(r) > Ua(r)
for all r ∈ [0, rˆ].
We have already seen, Propositions 6 and 7, that in some special cases, a reduction
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in the dispersion of rewards is suﬃcient to make performance fall for all competitors.
We give an example of this, which has another interesting property.
Example 1 Assume that U(x, y, s) = xαys for some α < 1, so rewards are multi-
plicatively separable, and that endowments are uniform on [1,2]. Suppose, for example,
rewards go from being uniform on [0.5,2.5] (Ha = 0.5s−0.25 or Sa = 2r+0.5) to being
uniform on [1,2] (Hp = s−1 or Sp = r+1). Then, by Proposition 7, performance must
fall almost everywhere as these two distributions satisfy Hp ≤∗ Ha, the ex post distribu-
tion is less dispersed in terms of the star order (and, also, the dispersion order). Note
that the lowest competitor would have a higher utility under the ex post distribution, i.e.
Up(0) > Ua(0), as she has a higher reward (but the same endowment). Indeed, everyone
with rank up to 0.5 must be better oﬀ by Proposition 9 as here the crossing point of Sa
and Sp is 0.5. But, further, here U 0(r) = xα(r)Z 0(r)S(r). If α is reasonably low so that
the influence of the lower performance ex post is not large, the slope of utility in rank
will not be very diﬀerent ex post. Thus, for example, for α < 0.35, everyone will be
better oﬀ under the less dispersed distribution Hp.
That is, by making rewards less dispersed, it is possible to reduce total performance
but make a Pareto improvement. Everyone will be happier because everyone works
less. This raises the question as to whether it would be possible to make everyone
better oﬀ by altering the level of inequality of endowments. However, while a greater
dispersion of endowments by Proposition 4 reduces performance for most (and possibly
all) competitors, it cannot make all better oﬀ for a fixed average endowment. This is
because the greater dispersion would lower the utility of low ranked competitors, as
they would have lower endowments in the more dispersed distribution.
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4 Results under Indexing by Level of Endowment
We now consider a situation where the endowment is intrinsic to the agent, for example,
talent. We, therefore, use the level-indexing method and compare an agent’sutility
before and after changes in the level of inequality given this fixed level of endowment.
As this method has been used before, for example by Hopkins and Kornienko (2004)
and Hopkins (2005), it thus requires less extensive coverage. We find an apparently
diﬀerent outcome from that under rank indexing as those with low endowments are
now worse oﬀ under lower inequality of endowments. The reason for this is that, as
discussed in Section 2, the direct eﬀect of lower inequality on an individual on a fixed
low level of endowments is negative, as opposed to positive under rank indexing.
We now look at the tournament from the perspective of indexing by levels of endow-
ments. That is, we consider the model introduced in Section 1 in terms of endowments
z not rank r. As before a continuum of contestants choose x to maximize utility (1).
Given the assortative assignment of rewards (2), we can now write the equilibrium re-
ward as a function of endowment as S(z) = H−1(G(z)). We look for a strictly increasing
symmetric equilibrium strategy as a function of endowments. The equilibrium strategy
x(z) will be a solution to the following diﬀerential equation, compare equation (5),
dx(z)
dz
=
Us(x, z − x, S(z))g(z)
Uy(x, z − x, S(z)− Ux(x, z − x, S(z))h(S(z))
=
dx(r)
dr
dr
dz
=
dx(r)
dr
g(z). (17)
The boundary condition will be x(z) = xc(G(z)), that is the same as in rank terms
(7). The only separating equilibrium in terms of endowments x(z) will be a solution to
the above equation. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 1. Working in terms
of endowments or ranks does not change the underlying game or its equilibria. We
emphasize that they are just diﬀerent ways of looking at the same behavior.
We will also look at individual welfare in terms of endowments. Define U(z) =
31
endowments
rank
endowments
utility
zˆz z¯ zˆz z¯
0
1
Up
Ua
Ga
Gp
Figure 6: Less unequal endowments, indexing by levels: typical comparative statics
when the ex post distribution of endowments Gp is less unequal than ex ante Ga.
Utility falls at low and middle levels of endowments.
U(x(z), z − x(z), S(z)), that is U(z) is equilibrium utility in terms of endowments z.
We show that a decrease in inequality of endowments amongst competitors reduces the
utility of the weakest competitors. In contrast, a similar decrease in the dispersion of
the rewards has an opposite eﬀect. In contrast to our work using rank-indexing, we
assume here that Ga and Gp have the same support [z, z¯] and that similarly there is a
common support [s, s¯] for the distributions of rewards Ha and Hp. Here we use second
order stochastic dominance to order distributions in terms of dispersion (see Appendix
A for the relationship among diﬀerent stochastic orders).
Proposition 10 Let Ua(z) and Up(z) be the equilibrium utilities in terms of endow-
ments ex ante and ex post respectively.
(i) Suppose that Gp second order stochastically dominates Ga. Denote the first cross-
ing of Ga(z) and Gp(z) as zˆ. Then, utility falls for the bottom and middle Up(z) ≤ Ua(z)
for all z ∈ [z, zˆ].
(ii) Suppose that Hp second order stochastically dominates Ha. Denote the first
crossing of Ha(s) and Hp(s) as sˆ, and denote zˆ = S−1(sˆ) = G−1(Hp(sˆ)) = G−1(Ha(sˆ)).
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Then, utility rises for the bottom and middle Up(z) ≥ Ua(z) for all z ∈ [z, zˆ].
That is, for those whose endowments are relatively low (e.g. less than zˆ in Figure
6), a less unequal distribution of endowments leads to lower individual welfare, while,
conversely, a similar decrease in inequality of rewards results in an increase in individual
welfare. This is because, as discussed in Section 2, for an individual with a fixed low level
of endowment, the direct eﬀect of lower inequality is negative, in that she will now have
a lower reward (again see Figure 2). This is because with the reduction in inequality
there are more contestants with middling endowments who will now take the middling
rewards. The incentive to compete is also increased by the greater social density and
so even those in the middle will be worse oﬀ as they compete harder. Conversely, the
direct eﬀect of less unequal rewards is positive and incentives to compete are reduced.
Thus, the results for reduced inequality of rewards for level indexing are qualitatively
similar to those for rank indexing depicted in Figure 5.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper introduces a new distinction between diﬀerent kinds of inequality. Inequal-
ity of initial endowments and inequality of the final rewards to success in society have
opposing eﬀects. Greater inequality of endowments decreases the degree of social com-
petition, greater inequality of rewards increases it. Thus, it is not the case that greater
inequality necessarily decreases happiness. Rather, it is inequality of rewards, not of
endowments, that is a likely cause of concern.
There has been much recent work concerned with the possibility that people have
intrinsic preferences over the level of inequality. Here, we oﬀer a reason why inequality
may matter even without any concern for social justice and in the absence of such social
preferences. This is because when there is interpersonal competition for employment
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and educational opportunities, inequality has a direct impact on incentives and, hence,
equilibrium eﬀort and equilibrium utility. The competitive threat of being excluded
from desirable opportunities means that, in equilibrium, everyone works too hard. This
means that people can be made better oﬀ by a change in incentives implicit in the two
diﬀerent forms of inequality. The majority can gain from a more dispersed distribution
of endowments or from a less dispersed distribution of rewards. In fact, we can construct
examples where a reduction in the inequality of rewards makes everyone better oﬀ,
that is, it is Pareto improving, even though this reduction in incentives decreases total
performance.
It is true that if contestants’ eﬀorts benefit other agents, such as partners, employers
or members of future generations, then there is a stronger case for reward inequality.
However, there remains a question as to whether those who lose from such inequality
are ever compensated. For example, gains to future generations may not be suﬃcient
recompense to those who lose now from greater inequality of rewards. Or, as another
possibility, societies with high inequality of rewards may have higher growth but lower
happiness for a given level of per capita income than societies with lesser inequality
of rewards. Thus, one clear direction for further research is to use the current model
as the stage game in a dynamic setting. Preliminary results in this direction indicate
that the eﬀects of changes in inequality on growth depend heavily on whether current
performance determines the rewards or the endowments of the next generation.
As we demonstrated in this paper, the relationship between inequality and individual
welfare can be less straightforward than is commonly thought. The gains and losses
to greater inequality even diﬀer according to the viewpoint taken, that is, whether we
compare at a constant level of endowment or at a constant rank in society. However,
rather than being a setback, we believe the richness of the relationships we have outlined
and the tools we have developed to analyze them oﬀer many possibilities for greater
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understanding of social phenomena.
For example, one of the more recent reasons advanced for the desirability of greater
income equality is the presence of relative concerns. It has been argued that in countries
where gross poverty has been eliminated, health tends to be driven by stress caused by
one’s relative position, which, in turn, is exacerbated by inequalities. The most famous
single case study is that of British civil servants, where health was found to be very
strongly positively correlated with a civil servant’s rank in the service (Marmot et al.
(1991)). It has been argued by several authors, notably Frank (1999, 2000), that if utility
does depend on relative position, greater equality should be socially beneficial. However,
Angus Deaton (2003) argues that the empirical evidence as a whole does not support
a general link between inequality and ill health. Furthermore, it has been diﬃcult to
establish whether there is a positive or negative relationship between inequality and
self-reported happiness or life-satisfaction (Alberto Alesina, Rafael di Tella and Robert
MacCulloch (2004), Andrew E. Clark (2003)).
This paper suggests a reason why this may be the case. Even when utility depends
on relative position, diﬀerent types of inequality may have opposite eﬀects. Therefore,
empirical work that is based on measures of inequality that conflate rewards and endow-
ments may obtain weak results as the two opposing eﬀects may cancel. The problem in
immediately applying this insight to empirical problems is that, to our knowledge, no
distinction between reward and endowment inequality has traditionally been made in
data collection. However, with data sources such as longitudinal studies becoming more
widely available, it may soon be possible to distinguish between initial endowments and
final rewards.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that, although this work approaches inequality
outside the framework of distributive justice, it does not mean that moral considerations
are irrelevant to the issue of inequality. In fact, precisely because existing theories of
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justice do not give interpersonal competition such a central role, our tournament model
may provide new tools and new insights that may be useful to researchers on distributive
justice. Thus, we hope that this paper, even though it takes a purely economic approach,
may aid our understanding of inequality in many of its aspects.
Appendix A: The Dispersive, Star and Other Sto-
chastic Orders
We use two diﬀerent stochastic orders, the dispersive and the star orders. These may not
be well known in economics (though see Hoppe et al. (2009)), but are extremely useful
for the social contests we consider. Let F andG be two arbitrary continuous distribution
functions each with support on an interval (but the two intervals need not be identical
or even overlap) and let F−1 and G−1 be the corresponding left-continuous inverses (so
that F−1(r) = inf{x : F (x) ≥ r}, r ∈ [0, 1] and G−1(r) = inf{x : G(x) ≥ r}, r ∈ [0, 1]),
and let f and g be the respective densities.
Definition 1 (Moshe Shaked and J. George Shanthikumar (2007, p148)) A variable
with distribution F is said to be smaller in the dispersive order (or less dispersed) than
a variable with a distribution G (denoted as F ≤d G) whenever G−1(r) − F−1(r) is
(weakly) increasing for r ∈ (0, 1).
That is, the diﬀerence in the two variables at a given rank increases in rank. This
has the following important consequence,
G ≥d F if and only if f(F−1(r)) ≥ g(G−1(r)) for all r ∈ (0, 1) (18)
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Figure 7: An example of the dispersion order: F ≤d G1 ∼d G2 ∼d G3
That is, for a fixed rank, the more dispersed distribution is less dense than the less
dispersed one. Note that because the condition (18) is expressed in terms of ranks,
there is no problem in comparing distributions with diﬀerent, even non-overlapping,
supports. Finally, when both distributions have finite means, if F is less dispersed than
G then VarF (z) ≤ VarG(z) whenever VarG(z) < ∞. Figure 7 shows a simple example
of distributions which are ordered in terms of the dispersion order. The distributions
G1B, G
2
B, G
3
B all have diﬀerent means but are equally dispersed and all are more dispersed
than GA. Figure 8 shows the importance of the dispersion order for incentives in the
tournament model: if a distribution Ha is more dispersed than a distribution Hp then
by (18) necessarily the inverse function Sa(r) is steeper than Sp(r). This is because if
S(r) = H−1(r), then S0(r) = 1/h(H−1(r)).
The star order is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, p214)). A variable with a distribution
F is smaller in the star order than a variable with a distribution G, or F ≤∗ G, if
G−1(F (z))/z increases for z ≥ 0.
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Figure 8: Dispersion order: If the ex post distribution is less dispersed than the ex ante,
or Hp ≤ Ha then the inverse distribution function Sp = H−1p (r) is less steep than Sa for
all r ∈ (0, 1), i.e. the marginal return to an increase in rank is lower.
Note that for two non-negative random variables X and Y , the star and dispersive
order have the following relationship:
X ≤∗ Y ⇐⇒ logX ≤d log Y (19)
However, if a distribution F is more dispersed than another distribution G, or F ≥d G,
it does not imply that F is larger in the star order, F ≥∗ G, though it is not excluded.
Nor does F ≥∗ G imply F ≥d G, nor does it rule it out.
Lemma 1 Take two distributions Ha(s), Hp(s) with support on the positive real line
and with diﬀerentiable inverses Sa(r) and Sp(r) respectively. Then, the following holds
Hp(s) ≥∗ Ha(s)⇔
d
dr
Sp(r)
Sa(r)
≥ 0⇔
S0p(r)
Sp(r)
≥ S
0
a(r)
Sa(r)
(20)
for all r ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof: The relationship between the first and second statements follows directly from
Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, p216 and Theorem 4.B.5). The relation between the
second and third follows from diﬀerentiation.
Economists often use second order stochastic dominance to order distributions in
terms of dispersion. However, there is no clear relation between the dispersive order and
second order stochastic dominance. This is because the second order stochastic domi-
nance relationship compares distributions both on the basis of the mean and dispersion
(variance). In contrast, the dispersive order is only concerned with dispersion. For ex-
ample, in Figure 7, distribution F second order stochastically dominates distributions
G1 and G2, but it is second order stochastically dominated by distribution G3.
On the other hand, since the star order implies single crossing of the distribution
functions, for two distributions with the same mean we have that if distribution Ha
is larger in the star order Ha ≥∗ Hp, then Ha second order stochastically dominates
Hp (Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007, p223, link the star and Lorenz order which is
essentially the same as second order stochastic dominance when comparing distributions
with the same mean). The following examples demonstrate the relationship between
the dispersion order, the star order, and the second order stochastic dominance order.
Example 2 If Ha(s) = s, that it is uniform on [0, 1] and Hp(s) = 2s− 0.5, a uniform
distribution on [0.25, 0.75], then Ha is more dispersed than Hp. Indeed, Sa(r)/Sp(r) =
r/(0.5r+0.25) which is increasing so Ha ≥∗ Hp. Furthermore, S0a(r) = 1 > 0.5 = S0p(r)
so that Ha ≥d Hp. And finally Hp second order stochastically dominates Ha.
This example illustrates a more substantive diﬀerence.
Example 3 If Ha(s) = s − 2, that it is uniform on [2,3] and Hp(s) = (s − 1)/2, a
uniform distribution on [1, 3], then Hp is more dispersed than Ha but stochastically
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lower. The dispersive order captures the dispersion so as S0a(r) = 1 < 2 = S
0
p(r) so
that Hp ≥d Ha. But, Sp(r)/Sa(r) = (2r + 1)/(2 + r) which is increasing so Hp ≥∗
Ha. However, as Ha stochastically dominates Hp, it also second order stochastically
dominates Hp.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: George J. Mailath (1987) establishes in a general signaling
model the existence and uniqueness of a separating equilibrium under certain conditions.
If the current model fits within Mailath’s framework, then it would follow that the
unique separating equilibrium is a solution to the diﬀerential equation (5) with boundary
condition x(0) = xc(0) from Theorems 1 and 2 of Mailath (1987, p1353). It would also
follow by Proposition 3 of Mailath (1987, p1362) that x(z) > xc(z) on (z, z¯). The only
substantial diﬀerence is that Mailath assumes the signaller’s utility is of the form (in
current notation) V (r, rˆ, x) where V is a smooth utility function and rˆ is the perceived
type, so that in a separating equilibrium the signaler has utility V (r, r, x). To apply
this here, first, fix G(z) and H(s). Now, clearly, one can define the function V (·) such
that V (r, rˆ, x) = U(x,Z(r)−x, S(rˆ)) everywhere on [0, 1]× [0, 1]× [z, z¯]. One can then
verify that the conditions (i)-(v) imposed on U(·) imply conditions (1)-(5) of Mailath
(1987, p1352) on V .12 In particular, note that condition (1) is simply that V is twice
diﬀerentiable, condition (2) is that V2 6= 0, here V2 = UsS0(r) > 0. Condition (3) is
that V13 6= 0 and here V13 = (Uxy−Uyy)Z 0(r) > 0. Mailath’s condition (4) requires that
V3(r, r, x) = 0 has a unique solution in x which maximizes V (r, r, x). Here, V3 = Ux−Uy
and we have assumed under condition (v) that there is a unique solution to the equation
Ux − Uy = 0. Since here V33 = Uxx − 2Uxy + Uyy < 0, this solution is a maximum.
12Mailath, in proving the intermediate result Proposition 5 (1987, p1364), also assumes that ∂V/∂rˆ
is bounded. Here, if we assume that both Us and S0(r) are bounded (the latter requires h(s) is non-zero
on its support), this result will also hold.
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Furthermore, since V33 is everywhere negative, Mailath’s condition (5) is automatically
satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 2: First note that, given the equation (5), we have that
x0a(r)
x0p(r)
=
φ(Za(r), S(r), xa)
φ(Zp(r), S(r), xp)
(21)
so that any point where xa = xp the relative slope only depends on Za and Zp, and thus
the slopes are equal whenever Za and Zp are equal. Furthermore, given our assumptions,
we have that
∂φ(z, s, x)
∂z
=
Uys(Uy − Ux)− Us(Uyy − Uxy)
(Uy − Ux)2
> 0 (22)
(by properties (iii) and (iv), it holds that Uy−Ux > 0 when evaluated at the equilibrium
solution as x(r) > xc(r)). Thus, at any point where xa(r) = xp(r) we have that x0a > x
0
p
(so that xa is steeper than xp and thus crosses xp from below) whenever Za(r) > Zp(r)
(i.e. whenever ex-ante endowments exceed ex-post endowments), and vice versa.
By the boundary condition (7), the condition Za(0) ≤ Zp(0) implies that xp(0) ≥
xa(0) (i.e. that the poorest individual, now that she has a greater endowment, chooses
greater performance). Given our assumption that Ga and Gp are distinct, it follows
that Zp(r) > Za(r) almost everywhere on (0, rˆ]. Thus, xp(r) can only cross xa(r) from
below except perhaps at the finite number of points where Zp(r) = Za(r).
We first rule out that that there is an interval where xp(r) ≤ xa(r). Suppose on the
contrary there exist at least one interval [r1, r2] ⊆ [0, rˆ] such that xp(r) ≤ xa(r). By the
continuity of xa and xp, it must be that xp(r1) = xa(r1). Note that
∂φ(z, s, x)
∂x
=
(Uxs − Uys)(Uy − Ux)− Us(2Uxy − Uxx − Uyy)
(Uy − Ux)2
< 0. (23)
In combination with (22), it would follow that x0a(r) < x
0
p(r) almost everywhere on
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[r1, r2], which combined with xa(r1) = xp(r1) is a contradiction to xp(r) ≤ xa(r) on the
interval. Thus, xp(r) > xa(r) almost everywhere on [0, rˆ].
We next rule out that xp(r) = xa(r) at individual points. Since the previous argu-
ment excludes intervals where xp(r) ≤ xa(r), equality is only possible at the isolated
points where Zp(r) = Za(r). But at any such point r˜ on (0, rˆ], as Zp(r) > Za(r) almost
everywhere, we have that gp(Zp(r˜)) ≥ ga(Za(r˜)) (remember that Z 0(r) = 1/g(Z(r))).
Now, note that Zp(r˜) = Za(r˜) = z˜. Next, we invoke the level-indexing approach and
consider solutions to the game in terms of endowments z. Let S(z) = H−1(G(z)).
Write solutions to the diﬀerential equation (17) as xp(z) and xa(z) for the respective
distributions of endowments. Then if xp(r˜) = xa(r˜), it must be that xp(z˜) = xa(z˜).
As xp(r) > xa(r) for r in (r˜ − , r˜) for some  > 0, we must have xp(z) > xa(z) for
endowments slightly less than z˜. Note that it must hold that x0p(r˜) = x
0
a(r˜), and for the
case of gp(z˜) > ga(z˜), it must be that x0p(z˜) > x
0
a(z˜) so that xp(z) crosses xa(z) from
below, which is a contradiction. This leaves us with the possibility that xp(r) = xa(r)
in a non-generic case of gp(Zp(r˜)) = ga(Za(r˜)).
Proof of Proposition 3: First, as endowments are (weakly) higher at r = 0, by
the boundary condition (7) the privately optimal performance will be higher ex post
xc,p(0) ≥ xc,a(0) as will equilibrium performance at r = 0. Thus, Up(0) ≥ Ua(0) (i.e. as
the poorest individual has no reduction in endowments she will not be worse oﬀ). We
have that
1
gp(Zp(r))
=
dZp(r)
dr
≥ dZa(r)
dr
=
1
ga(Z(r))
for all r ∈ [0, 1]
In other words, Zp(r) is (weakly) steeper than Za(r) on [0, 1], so that clearly Zp(r) ≥
Za(r) for r ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose that Up(0) > Ua(0), and suppose, in contradiction to the claim we are
trying to prove, that Up(r) equals Ua(r) at least once on (0, 1). Denote the first such
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point as r1 ∈ (0, 1). It is easy to show that, as Zp(0) ≥ Za(0) and Gp ≥d Ga, we have
Zp(r) > Za(r) for all r ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, by Corollary 1, xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, 1], and it
must be that yp(r) < ya(r) in the neighborhood of r1. Let Ui,y(r) = Uy(xi(r), Zi(r) −
xi(r), S(r)) for i = a, p. Then, as dUy = Uxydx + Uyydy, and, given our original
assumptions on U , it must be that Up,y(r) > Ua,y(r) in the neighborhood of r1. Using
the marginal utility condition (8), combined with the fact that, given the dispersion
order, g(Zp(r)) ≤ g(Za(r)) , it must be that U 0p(r) > U 0a(r) in the neighborhood of
r1, so that Up(r) can only be steeper than Ua(r), and thus can only cross from below.
Given Up(0) > Ua(0), we are done.
Suppose, instead, that we have that Up(0) = Ua(0). Then, the above argument
rules out that Up can cross Ua from above, so that the claim can only fail if there is
an interval (0, r˜) on which Up(r) ≤ Ua(r). Then, there must exist a point r2 ∈ (0, r˜)
such that U 0p(r2) ≤ U 0a(r2) and Up,y ≤ Ua,y. But given (8) and also that Gp ≥d Ga,
if U 0p(r2) ≤ U 0a(r2) then Up,y(r2) ≤ Ua,y(r2), which can only happen if yp(r2) ≥ ya(r2).
But this, combined with the fact that xp(r2) > xa(r2) (by Proposition 2) implies that
Up(r2) > Ua(r2), which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4: From Proposition 2, we have xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, rˆ]. But
note as here Zp(0) > Za(0), the lowest agent has a strictly greater endowment, we
have also xp(0) > xa(0) as the cooperative choice, which is the equilibrium choice
of the bottom agent by (7), is increasing in endowments. Turning to utility, we can
consider two cases. First, suppose that xp(r) ≥ xa(r) on [rˆ, 1]. Then, as endowments for
individuals with rank (rˆ, 1] are strictly lower ex-post than ex-ante, we have necessarily
yp(r) < ya(r) on [rˆ, 1]. Now, as xp(r) ≥ xa(r) and yp(r) < ya(r), then for some r˜
we can find a pair (x˜, y˜) such that x˜ + y˜ = xp + yp (that is, (x˜, y˜) are feasible given
ex-post endowments) but xc,p < x˜ < xp and y˜ = ya. But then, U(xp(r), yp(r), S(r)) <
U(x˜, y˜, S(r)) < U(xa(r), ya(r), S(r)), and the result follows.
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Suppose now instead that xp(r) < xa(r) for some r in (r1, r2) with r1 > rˆ. If
yp(r) ≤ ya(r) on that interval, it is clear that Up(r) < Ua(r) and we are done. Suppose
instead that yp(r) > ya(r) on some interval (r3, r4) with r4 ≤ r2 (as endowments
are lower ex post for r > rˆ, it must be that r3 > r1). We want to rule out the
possibility of Up(r) ≥ Ua(r) somewhere on this interval. Now, it must be the case
that Up(r3) < Ua(r3) as xp(r3) < xa(r3) and yp(r3) = ya(r3). We have gp(r) ≥ ga(r)
everywhere. Furthermore, dUy = Uxydx+Uyydy. Given that x decreases and y increases
ex post on (r3, r4) and our original assumptions on U , it can be calculated that, given
(8), that U 0p(r) < U
0
a(r) on this interval. Combined with Up(r3) < Ua(r3), the result
follows.
Proof of Proposition 5: First, given the boundary condition (7), we have x(0) =
xc(0). Note that applying property (v) to the definition of xc(r) in (6), we have ∂xc/∂s ≤
0 so that given Sp(0) < Sa(0), it follows that xp(0) ≥ xa(0). Almost everywhere on
[0, rˆ), we have both Sa(r) > Sp(r) and S0p(r) > S
0
a(r). Note that
∂φ(z, s, x)
∂s
=
Uss(Uy − Ux)− Us(Uys − Uxs)
(Uy − Ux)2
≤ 0. (24)
It immediately follows that if xa(r) = xp(r) anywhere on [0, rˆ), then x0a(r) > x
0
p(r). So,
there can only be one crossing of xa(r) and xp(r) on that interval and xp(r) must cut
xa(r) from below. Thus, the only way for the claim to be false is if xp(r) ≤ xa(r) on
some interval [0, r1]. But then, as ∂φ(z, s, x)/∂x < 0 by (23) and ∂φ(z, s, x)/∂s ≤ 0 by
(24), and as Sp(r) < Sa(r) and S0p(r) > S
0
a(r), it follows that x
0
p(r) > x
0
a(r) on [0, r1],
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6: Given additively separable utility, we have xp(0) = xa(0) =
xc(0) as with separable utility the cooperative choice does not depend on S(0). The
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diﬀerential equation (5) is now
x0(r) =
S0(r)
Vy(x,Z(r)− x)− Vx(x,Z(r)− x)
(25)
Given the dispersion order, we have S0p(r) ≥ S0a(r) for all r and the result is easy to
establish using the arguments in the proof of the previous proposition.
Proof of Proposition 7: As with additive separable utility, we have xp(0) = xa(0)
irrespective of Sa(0) or Sp(0). The diﬀerential equation is now
x0(r) =
S0(r)
S(r)
V (x,Z(r)− x)
Vy(x, Z(r)− x)− Vx(x, Z(r)− x)
.
Now, by Lemma 1 in Appendix A, by the star order we have S0p(r)/Sp(r) ≥ S0a(r)/Sa(r)
for all r. The proof again then follows that of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 8: Given the lowest reward S(0) is higher ex post, we have
Up(0) > Ua(0). We divide [0, 1] into two sets. Let I1 consist of points where xp(r) ≥
xa(r) and I2 consist of points where xp(r) < xa(r). Considering I2, as rewards are
higher and eﬀort lower, clearly Up(r) > Ua(r) on I2. Turning to I1, here xp(r) ≥ xa(r)
and hence yp(r) ≤ ya(r). Now, as U 0(r) = UyS(r)/g(Z(r)) and dUy = Uxydx + Uyydy,
we have U 0p(r) > U
0
a(r) almost everywhere on I1. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 9: We have Sa(r) < Sp(r) and S0p(r) < S
0
a(r) on [0, rˆ). Thus,
by reversing Proposition 5, we have xa(r) > xp(r) on (0, rˆ]. Furthermore, given that
rˆ is the first point of crossing, we have Sa(r) < Sp(r) on [0, rˆ). It is clear that, as
performance is strictly lower and rewards are higher under distribution Hp(s), it follows
that Up(r) > Ua(r).
Proof of Proposition 10: We have by the envelope theorem U 0(z) = Uy(x(z), z −
x(z), S(z)). First, we look at (i). Suppose the claim is false, and there exists at least
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one interval on (z, zˆ] where Up(z) > Ua(z). Let us denote the set of points as IU =
{z ≤ zˆ : Up(z) > Ua(z)} (possibly disjoint), and let z1 = inf IU ≥ z. We can find a
z2 ∈ IU such that Up(z) > Ua(z) for all z in (z1, z2]. Note that since, by the common
boundary condition, Up(z) = Ua(z). As Gp(z) ≤ Ga(z), then Sp(z) ≤ Sa(z) for all
z ∈ IU . As rewards are lower, for Up(z) > Ua(z) to be possible, it must be the case that
xA(z) < xB(z) for all z ∈ IU . But then as U 0 is increasing in x(z) and strictly increasing
in S(z), we have U 0p(z) ≤ U 0a(z) on IU . This, together with Up(z1) = Ua(z1), implies
Up(z) ≤ Ua(z) for all z ∈ (z1, z2], which is a contradiction. Part (ii) can be established
by an identical argument
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